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Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are con-
ﬁrmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the conﬁrming ev-
idence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robust-
ness arguments: ontic independence (OI)—when the multiple lines of evidence depend
on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many
assume that OI is sufﬁcient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, we ar-
gue that, as typically construed, OI is not a sufﬁcient independence condition for war-
ranting robustness arguments. We show that OI evidence can collectively conﬁrm a hy-
pothesis to a lower degree than individual lines of evidence, contrary to the standard
assumption undergirding usual robustness arguments. We employ Bayesian networks
to represent the ideal empirical scenario for a robustness argument and a variety of ways
in which empirical scenarios can fall short of this ideal.1. That Special Epistemic Oomph. Many suppose that when a variety of
evidence supports a hypothesis, this hypothesis is more likely to be true. The
property of inductive arguments that licenses this supposition is sometimes
called ‘robustness’ (we will call such arguments ‘robustness arguments’).
Philosophers have employed robustness arguments as support for various
forms of realism, including causal realism, entity realism, natural kind real-
ism, and theory realism and to counter the experimenter’s regress argument,
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 415from real entities, to aid us in our pursuit of objectivity, and to permit the ob-
servation of unobservable entities.
As an argument for one of these forms of scientiﬁc realism, robustness is
often formulated as a no-miracles argument, or an argument from coinci-
dence. Here, for example, is Salmon (1997) discussing the canonical Perrin
episode, based on the agreement of multiple methods of measuring Avo-
gadro’s number: “such agreement would be miraculous if matter were not
composed of molecules and atoms.” That is, it would be a miracle if diverse
evidence supported a hypothesis and the hypothesis were not true; we do not
accept miracles as compelling explanations; thus, when diverse evidence
supports a hypothesis, we have strong grounds to believe that it is true. It
is often assumed that diverse evidence that supports a hypothesis provides
a special epistemic oomph to the hypothesis.1 In what follows we formulate
the notion of diversity of evidence and show that only very particular empir-
ical scenarios warrant a robustness argument, and such scenarios are con-
strained in ways not usually recognized in the wide literature that appeals
to robustness arguments.2
Robustness arguments are said to be compelling only if the multiple kinds
of available evidence are independent. Regarding Perrin’s multiple methods
of measuring Avogadro’s number, Salmon (1984) urges his reader to “notice
what a wide variety of substances are involved and how diverse are the phe-
nomena being observed.”Culp (1995) considers robustness arguments com-
pelling if the following condition is met: “the techniques must not all use the
same theoretical presuppositions in making raw data interpretations” (450).
Similarly, when Hacking (1983) asked “Do we see through a microscope?”
he was interested in the experimental strategies that a scientist could use to
be conﬁdent that features of an object observed under a microscope are real1. Among many others, see Cartwright (1983), Salmon (1984), Bechtel (2002), Snyder
(2005), and Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016). Robustness was famously discussed in
the nineteenth century by Whewell (1837), who gave it the name “consilience of induc-
tions.” Sometimes this inductive principle is held to be axiomatic: “It is an analytic prop-
osition . . . that, other things being equal, the evidence for a generalization is strong in
proportion as the number of favorable instances, and the variety of circumstances in
which they have been found, is great” (Strawson 1952, 256–57).
2. Our concern is with concordant evidence for an empirical hypothesis. There is a
growing literature on robustness of models. For example, Levins (1966, 420) and
Wimsatt (1981) have argued that robustness is valuable for modeling—because models
employ idealizations, “truth is the intersection of independent lies.” In contrast, Cart-
wright (1991) argued that robustness arguments in econometric modeling are crude in-
ductions, and Orzack and Sober (1993) have criticized model robustness on the charge
of its being a nonempirical form of conﬁrmation. The debate continues today by, e.g.,
Weisberg (2006), Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni (2010), Odenbough and
Alexandrova (2011), and Parker (2011). The present article is not concerned with ro-
bustness of models.
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All uand not artifacts of the apparatus. Conﬁdence is gained, according to Hack-
ing, if different kinds of microscopes are used, because “these processes
have virtually nothing in common between them. They are essentially unre-
lated chunks of physics.” The independence condition is meant to ensure
that the concordant evidence from multiple methods is due to the object
of investigation rather than an error-prone feature shared by the methods. It
is independence of the material or theoretical basis of observational appara-
tuses—what we call ontic independence (OI)—that many philosophers have
assumed to be the relevant kind of independence required for robustness ar-
guments. Substances, theories, or chunks of physics: these are the sorts of
things that are often said must differ between lines of evidence in order to sat-
isfy the independence condition for robustness arguments. When ontically in-
dependent evidence supports a hypothesis, it is often thought that one can con-
struct a robustness argument.3
In order to explore the consequences of evidential independence and to
represent the various ways in which such independence can fail, we employ
the graphical device of Bayesian networks.4 We use Bayesian networks ﬁrst
to represent an empirical scenario that exempliﬁes an ideal robustness argu-
ment (sec. 2). The ideal robustness argument satisﬁes ontic independence
but, more importantly, satisﬁes what we call conditional probabilistic inde-
pendence (CPI). The Bayesian network representation allows us to show
that in such ideal empirical scenarios, adding different kinds of independent
evidence is guaranteed to increase conﬁrmation, thereby providing some
warrant to robustness arguments. We then use a Bayesian network to repre-
sent the usual way inwhich robustness is said to fail, namely, when the various
kinds of evidence are not ontically independent (sec. 3). Two short case stud-
ies illustrate such a scenario. Even when the various kinds of evidence are
ontically independent and all the evidence conﬁrms the same hypothesis, a ro-
bustness argumentmay not bewarranted.A radicalway robustness arguments
can fail to be warranted even when the evidence is ontically independent in-
volves scenarios in which the evidence is ‘dyssynergystic’: again using Bayes-
ian networks, we represent possible empirical scenarios in which this can
happen (sec. 4). If the different kinds of evidence are CPI, however, then
we can show that the evidence is not dyssynergystic. We conclude by dis-
cussing logical and epistemic constraints on robustness arguments (sec. 5).3. Hudson (2014) offers a rare criticism of the assumption that converging OI evidence
warrants robustness arguments. Though our conclusion is broadly consistent with
Hudson’s, our approach is quite different; speciﬁcally, we are unsatisﬁed with his treat-
ment of probabilistic independence, but arguing the point here would take us astray.
4. Bovens and Hartmann (2004) have led the way for this approach, with their insightful
analysis of evidence and conﬁrmation using Bayesian networks. Claveau (2013) has
more recently developed the approach of Bovens and Hartmann.
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 417In short, robustness arguments require different kinds of evidence to be
independent, and explications of this notion of independent evidence fall
into two families: OI and CPI. Many strong conclusions have been drawn
on the basis of robustness arguments in which the evidence is OI, and we
show that such arguments are not generally justiﬁed. As typically construed,
not all OI evidence is CPI. However, OI and CPI are not necessarily distinct:
employing the graphical device of Bayesian networks, we show one way in
which OI evidence can be structured in an empirical scenario such that the
conditions of CPI are satisﬁed and thus that one is ensured an increase in
conﬁrmation of one’s target hypothesis.
2. Ideal Robustness Arguments. We take a very general view of what
must be robust in robustness arguments, namely, conﬁrmational support that
diverse lines of evidence provide to a hypothesis. In the Perrin case so often
discussed by philosophers, it was the measurement of a physical quantity
(Avogadro’s number) that was robust. But robustness can be characterized
in a more general way than agreement among measurements of a quantity
by different lines of evidence: robustness can involve multiple lines of evi-
dence providing conﬁrmational support to the same hypothesis. Our cases
described in section 3 are exemplary in this regard. Woodward (2006) offers
a catalogue of various kinds of robustness—including measurement robust-
ness, derivational robustness, causal robustness, and inferential robustness—
and suggests that considerations that undergird one type of robustness may not
undergird another type of robustness.We think it worthwhile to attempt to for-
mulate an ideal robustness argument, the logic of which is general with respect
to undergirding different kinds of robustness. That is what follows here.
To represent the ideal robustness argument we employ Bayesian net-
works. A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model. We start with
a set of variables and a joint probability distribution deﬁned over them. The
structure of conditional dependencies between these variables is represented
in a directed acyclic graph, where the variables are the nodes and the connec-
tions or edges represent the dependencies.5 If there are two nodes A and B
such that Pr(AjB) ≠ Pr(A), and this correlation is not screened off by con-
ditionalizing on all of A’s parents in the graph (excluding B), then there is a
connection between A and B.65. A graph consists of nodes with connections between them. A graph is directed if the
connections have directions associated with them. A graph is acyclic if there are no
loops from a variable back to itself. We use capital letters to represent variables and ital-
ics to represent values of those variables; thus X represents the variable X, which in the
binary case can take the value X (X is true) or ~X (X is false).
6. For more on Bayesian networks and their application in causal discovery, see Pearl
(2000).
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All uThe dependency relations represented by our Bayesian networks are in-
ferential. Of course, inferential dependencies might arise as a result of causal
dependencies. To use an example of Bovens and Hartmann (2004), suppose
a disease is characterized as the presence of bacteria in the blood (R1), and
there are two symptoms that accompany this disease: internal bleeding (R2)
and inﬂammation of the lymph system (R3). Characteristic R1 has a “direct
inﬂuence” on R2 and R3, to use the terminology of Bovens and Hartmann
(2004, 71). Of course, from R2 and R3 we can infer R1 (a diagnostic infer-
ence). Or from R1 we could infer R2 and R3 (a prognostic inference). Nei-
ther of the symptoms has an inﬂuence on each other: R2 is independent of R3
oncewe conditionalize on R1. In any case, it is the probabilistic relations that
permit the inferences, and it is the causal inﬂuence fromR1 to R2 andR3 that
determines the directionality of the edge in their graph that represents this
case.
For our purposes we need only one rule about inferring dependencies
from graphical structure. Articulating the rule, however, will require some
terminology. Let X and Y be two variables in a graph G, and Z be a set of
variables in G that does not contain either X or Y. A trail between two var-
iables is an undirected path between those two variables, that is, a path that
follows connections, but not necessarily in the direction of those connec-
tions. A variable C on a trail is a collider relative to that trail if and only if
it is not one of the end points of the trail and both the incoming and outgoing
connections to C on that trail are directed toward C. So the trail near C can be
represented by ﬁgure 1.
D-separation is a central notion for Bayesian networks and can be used to
determine if two variables X and Y are independent, given Z. Variables X
and Yare d-separated by Z if and only if there is at least one variable on ev-
ery trail between X and Y that is either not a collider and is in Z or is a col-
lider and is neither in Z nor is an ancestor of any variable in Z. This condi-
tion ensures that theMarkov condition holds. The Markov condition entails
that variables X and Yare probabilistically independent conditional on Z if
and only if Z d-separates X and Y. This allows one to visually determine con-
ditional (in)dependencies in a Bayesian network.
In ﬁgure 2, H is the hypothesis of interest, and C1 and C2 are two conse-
quences of this hypothesis that are open to empirical test. These need not be
deductive consequences: it may be the case that Pr(C1jH ) < 1. However,Figure 1. C is a collider on the trail between A and B.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 419wedo require that Pr(C1jH ) > Pr(C1). The variables E1 and E2 represent ev-
idential states that indicate whether or not C1 and C2, respectively, are true
or false and thereby are evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of H. In other
words, we have
Pr E1jC1ð Þ > Pr E1ð Þ:
The pieces of evidence are indicators of the truth or falsity of H only if cer-
tain auxiliary assumptions about the observational apparatus and empirical
scenario hold (represented by variables A1–A4). The auxiliary assumptions
are supported by background theories (represented by variables T1 and T3).
The two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 may be inﬂuenced by auxiliary as-
sumptions (A2 and A3) that rely on the same background theory, which
would apparently violate the premise of robustness arguments that the
modes of evidence must be independent. We doubt that we are ever in an
empirical situation in which the modes of evidence rely on entirely distinct
sets of background theories. In all real cases there will be at least some com-
mon theoretical background to the multiple modes of evidence. Despite that,
if we are sufﬁciently convinced of such theories, they ought not be consid-
ered a threat to robustness arguments. For instance, if the common assump-
tions stem from a highly conﬁrmed physical theory, such as wave optics,
they do not engender a problematic form of dependence between the modes
of evidence. Problems for robustness arise if the common background as-
sumptions or associated theories are themselves controversial. Intuitively,
if there is a nonnegligible chance that we are wrong about a background as-
sumption, then we must consider the possibility that concordance among
modes of evidence that share this assumption is attributable to the false as-
sumption rather than the truth of the investigated hypothesis. However, thisFigure 2. Bayesian network representation of an ideal robustness argument.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All uis not a credible problem if the common assumption is extremely well sub-
stantiated. In our ideal case, there may be a common theory legitimating the
particular auxiliary assumptions. However, if this theory is sufﬁciently well
established that we can treat it as essentially having probability one, then it
drops out of the graph as a relevant factor.
In ﬁgure 2 all the auxiliary assumptions are indeed unconditionally inde-
pendent. The theories T1 and T3 are not common assumptions of both
modes of evidence. These assumptionsmight be controversial. As above, ro-
bustness does not require the independence of all theoretical assumptions
between the modes of evidence; rather, it requires only independence of
problematic or controversial auxiliary assumptions.
The ideal robustness argument can be validated by appeal to ﬁgure 2. The
hypothesis H d-separates E1 and E2.7 The only trail between these variables
is E1-C1-H-C2-E2, and H is on this trail and not a collider. It follows that
Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ 5 Pr E1jHð Þ  Pr E2jHð Þ:
We have already stipulated that E1 and E2 individually conﬁrm H. This
means that the likelihood ratios associated with these pieces of evidence
must be greater than one. The likelihood ratio for E1 is
LRE1 5 Pr E1jHð Þ= Pr E1j∼Hð Þ > 1:
A similar expression holds for LRE2, the likelihood ratio for E2. The inde-
pendence of E1 and E2 conditional onH allows us to calculate the likelihood
ratio for the conjunction of both pieces of evidence:
LRE1&E2 5 Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ= Pr E1 & E2j∼Hð Þ
5 LRE1  LRE2:
The second equality follows from the independence assumption. Since LRE1
and LRE2 are both greater than one, it follows that LRE1&E2 must be greater
than either of the individual likelihood ratios (this argument appears in Sober
[2008]). A higher likelihood ratio corresponds to a higher degree of conﬁr-
mation, so the conjunction of the evidence is more conﬁrmatory than either
individual piece of evidence.8 Here, then, we have some grounds for the de-7. More precisely, the set of variables {H} d-separates E1 and E2. However, in what fol-
lows we will leave out the braces when speaking of a singleton set, since nothing in our
argument hinges on distinguishing a singleton set and its element.
8. The posterior odds of a hypothesis are obtained by multiplying the prior odds by the
likelihood ratio; so given identical prior odds, a greater likelihood ratio will raise the
probability of the hypothesis to a greater degree. This argument demonstrating the in-
crease in conﬁrmation based on diverse evidence is not sensitive to the use of the like-
lihood ratio as a measure of conﬁrmation; see the appendix for a general proof.
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 421sirability of independent evidence. If we can ensure that the evidence we col-
lect will be independent conditional on the truth of the hypothesis being in-
vestigated, then we know that the more conﬁrmatory evidence we gather, the
more the hypothesis is conﬁrmed.
3. Failure of Ontic Independence. Most philosophical discussions of ro-
bustness have presumed that one needs only to ensure that the modes of ev-
idence themselves are independent. The focus has been on departures from
the ideal case represented by ﬁgure 3. In ﬁgure 3 there is a trail E1-A2-E2
that does not contain H. Hypothesis H no longer d-separates E1 and E2,
and so the warrant for the ideal robustness argument no longer applies. This
is a way of representing the fact that E1 and E2 are not OI.
If various kinds of evidence support a hypothesis, and thus seem to war-
rant a robustness argument, yet the kinds of evidence are not OI, then the
inductive argument has the property of ‘pseudorobustness’.9 The following
examples are illustrative.
3.1. Mesosomes. In the early days of electron microscopy, multiple
methods of preparing microscope samples suggested the existence of an
as-yet undiscovered cellular organelle, dubbed the ‘mesosome’, an entity
that is now considered an artifact (Rasmussen 1993). During the 1950s
and 1960s, cell biologists claimed that they had discovered this new struc-
ture within Bacillus cells. Fitz-James (1960) called such structures meso-
somes and suggested that they were organelles of many bacteria. Fitz-James
used multiple ﬁxation techniques to preserve the bacteria and observed meso-
somes using both electron microscopes and light microscopes. Fitz-James
also claimed to observe mesosomes in living bacteria by using a special
staining technique. Thus it appears that a robustness argument could have
been formulated for the existence of mesosomes. This is precisely what
Fitz-James did.10 The warrant for such a robustness argument continued to
get stronger. A large body of work, which continued into the 1970s, was con-
cerned with determining the function of the mesosome. Biochemists puriﬁed
mesosomes and subjected them to numerous tests, and this was done with
multiple species of bacteria.9. The term ‘pseudorobustness’was introduced, as far as we can tell, byWimsatt (1981).
10. Fitz-James made a robustness argument despite some apparent discordance between
the kinds of evidence. Rasmussen (1993) argued that concordant evidence was used as
an argument for robustness, but discordance was explained away by appealing to differ-
ences in experimental setup. See also Culp (1995).
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All uUltimately most scientists came to think that mesosomes are artifacts, and
this shift was partially due to new methods of ﬁxing bacteria.11 Thus from
what we know now, this is a case of pseudorobustness. The modes of evi-
dence presented by Fitz-James relied on a shared technique for preparing
the microscope samples. With respect to a robustness argument, this means
that there was an inferential bottleneck like that of A2 in ﬁgure 3. The avail-
able evidence was not in fact sufﬁciently independent for a robustness argu-
ment to be justiﬁed; that is, the available evidence was not OI.
If one wants to justify a robustness argument, then an obvious methodo-
logical prescription is to avoid such inferential bottlenecks. The difﬁculty
with this methodological prescription is that one must know that the various
kinds of evidence are actually OI: the presence of inferential bottlenecks
must be discernible. Sometimes this is simple. The following case is another
example of pseudorobustness in which it was indeed possible to identify in-
ferential bottlenecks. Moreover, although the mesosome case was an exam-
ple of a pseudorobustness argument supporting a false hypothesis, not all
cases of pseudorobustness are such that the apparently diverse evidence sup-
ports a false hypothesis. The following is a case in which an inductive argu-
ment for a hypothesis was criticized as pseudorobust but later that hypoth-
esis was accepted as true.Figure 3. Auxiliary assumption (A2) inﬂuences both modes of evidence, and so H
no longer d-separates E1 and E2.11. Hudson (1999) argued that this suggests that the relevant scientists were less swayed
by the concordance of diverse evidence than they were by evidence from a single mode
that was deemed more reliable than other modes. Hudson calls this ‘reliable process rea-
soning’. See also Hudson (2014).
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 4233.2. The Chemical Composition of Genes. Determining the material
basis of heredity was an important research program in the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century. The evidence presented in the famous paper by Avery,
Macleod, and McCarty (1944) is a paradigm example of pseudorobustness,
about a hypothesis now widely thought to be basically correct.
A phenomenon called ‘transformation’ of bacteria motivated this work.
One type of bacteria (nonvirulent, morphologically rough pneumococci)
could be transformed into another type (virulent and morphologically
smooth): heat-killed smooth virulent pneumococci could be injected into
mice along with live nonvirulent rough pneumococci, and the live bacteria
would change virulence and morphology (from nonvirulent to virulent, and
from rough to smooth). This phenomenon of transformation was possibly a
kind of hereditary phenomenon. Thus it was thought that the chemical basis
of the transformation substance (TS) could have genetic signiﬁcance.
It was assumed bymost that the TSwas a protein: proteins were known to
be highly variable, whereas nucleic acids were thought to be a repetitive
structural molecule. The structure of TS was assumed to be complex, be-
cause the phenotypic features transferred between pneumococcal types were
complex: a complex function, it was thought, must be caused by a complex
structure.
Avery et al. (1944) provided evidence that the TS is composed of DNA.
A reconstruction of the hypothesis and evidence of Avery et al. is as fol-
lows:H
All ypothesis H. The molecule that causes transformation (the TS) is DNA.Evidence:
Mode 1. Chemical analysis of TS: (E1): the amounts of carbon, hy-
drogen, nitrogen, and phosphorous were close to the theo-
retical values for DNA.
Mode 2. Effect of protein and ribonucleic acid–degrading enzymes
on TS: (E2): protein and ribonucleic acid–degrading en-
zymes had no effect on TS.
Mode 3. Effect of DNA-degrading enzyme on activity of TS: (E3):
DNA-degrading enzyme inactivated the TS.
Mode 4. Ultraviolet absorption of TS: (E4): ultraviolet absorption
of TS was characteristic of DNA.
Mode5. Electrophoretic movement of TS: (E5): electrophoretic
movement of TS was characteristic of DNA.
Mode 6. Molecular weight analysis of TS: (E6): molecular weight
of TS was characteristic of DNA.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All uThus, seemingly diverse evidence supported H, apparently warranting a ro-
bustness argument.
Critics pounced. The main experimental concern was that the TS was
very likely impure and could have had trace amounts of protein in it. It was
this protein, critics claimed, that was the true cause of transformation. The
chemical tests available at the time were not sensitive enough to detect the
presence of up to 5% protein, and the enzymatic experiments could have
been ineffective in degrading an active protein, especially if it was covered
by structural nucleic acids (for more details on this case, see Stegenga [2011]).
Not only did this criticism imply that any particular piece of evidence
might have been an artifact, the criticism also implied that every kind of ev-
idence used by Avery et al. (1944) shared an inferential bottleneck: the iso-
lation and puriﬁcation of the TS. All of modes 1–6 were a form of analysis
on the TS and as such relied on the same method of isolating and purifying
TS; thus, the evidence was not OI. In this case, this inferential bottleneckwas
thought by critics to be unreliable.
3.3. Summary. Inductive arguments with the property of pseudoro-
bustness are sometimes mustered to support what later comes to be seen
as a false hypothesis, as in the mesosome case, but are sometimes mustered
to support what later comes to be accepted as a true hypothesis, as in the
DNA case. Since robustness is widely thought to be a virtue of inductive
arguments, then, when diverse evidence is available for a hypothesis, to
avoid the kind of pseudorobustness discussed in this section one must en-
sure that the various kinds of evidence appealed to are OI.
There is, however, another kind of pseudorobustness that has not often
been discussed. This kind of pseudorobustness cannot be avoided by ensur-
ing ontic independence between the kinds of evidence. And unlike the ﬁrst
kind of pseudorobustness, in every case of this kind of pseudorobustness the
various ontically independent kinds of evidence that all individually support
a hypothesis, when considered together, support a competitor of that hypoth-
esis. We now turn to this troubling form of pseudorobustness.
4. Dyssynergystic Evidence. The philosophical literature on robustness
has focused on ensuring that departures from the ideal robustness argument
as described in section 3 and represented in ﬁgure 3 are avoided. The nearly
universal idea seems to be that if the modes of evidence are OI (and the in-
dependent lines of evidence are conﬁrming), then a robustness argument is
warranted.
However, there are other ways that the structure of dependencies can de-
part from the ideal of ﬁgure 2, such that the validation of robustness provided
above does not apply. The validation of robustness in section 2 simply estab-
lished that conditional independence of E1 and E2 given H is sufﬁcient forThis content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 425robustness, not that it is necessary. It might be the case that even if this in-
dependence assumption is not satisﬁed, there is some other reason for think-
ing that more kinds of evidence increase conﬁrmation, provided there are no
common background assumptions. In what follows, however, we show that
for a variety of simple departures from the ideal robustness scenario, it is
possible to construct examples in which multiple conﬁrmatory pieces of ev-
idence are dyssynergystic: the conjoined evidence is less conﬁrmatory than
either of the conjuncts. In fact, in our examples, the conjoined evidence will
be shown to be disconﬁrming, even though the individual conjuncts are con-
ﬁrmatory.
Diverse kinds of evidence that all individually support a hypothesis are
dyssynergystic when the conjunction of all the evidence is less conﬁrming
than the conjunction of any proper subset of the evidence. The following
is a formal deﬁnition.All Dyssynergystic Evidence (DE). Two pieces of evidence, E1 and E2, are
dyssynergystic if and only if E1 and E2 are ontically independent, both E1
and E2 conﬁrm H, and c(H, E1 & E2) < c(H, E1) or c(H, E1 & E2) < c(H,
E2), for a given conﬁrmation measure c.When OI evidence is DE, a robustness argument based on the OI evi-
dence cannot be made. In what follows we provide three hypothetical cases
to illustrate DE.
4.1. La Jolla Murder Mystery. The structure of dependencies repre-
sented in ﬁgure 4 is another form of departure from the ideal (on this graph
and all following we have dropped the nodes representing auxiliary as-
sumptions for the sake of simplicity).Figure 4. H no longer d-separates E1 and E2 because there is a dependency be-
tween C1 and C2 (and thereby between E1 and E2), even if we conditionalize on H.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All uThe following case illustrates the dependencies represented in ﬁgure 4. A
detective investigating a murder has an initial list of suspects, 50% of whom
are from La Jolla. The detective acquires two pieces of evidence at the crime
scene. A blond hair is found on the victim’s body that must be the murderer’s
and a bit of the murderer’s blood, determined to be type A. These pieces of
evidence are OI. There are no substantive background assumptions in com-
mon between the tools used to analyze the blood and the tools used to ana-
lyze the hair.
The detective studies the suspects and discovers the following:
1. 60% of the suspects from La Jolla have blond hair.
2. 40% of the suspects from outside La Jolla have blond hair.
3. 60% of the suspects from La Jolla have type A blood.
4. 40% of the suspects from outside La Jolla have type A blood.
5. 20% of the suspects fromLa Jolla have both blond hair and typeAblood.
6. 40% of the suspects from outside La Jolla have both blond hair and
type A blood.
These conditional probabilities are summarized in table 1.
Let H be the hypothesis that the murderer is from La Jolla, C1 be that
the murderer has blonde hair, C2 be that the murderer has blood type A,
and let E1 be the blond hair and E2 be the type A blood. It is clear from
the data that Pr(E1jH) > Pr(E1j∼H) and Pr(E2jH ) > Pr(E2j∼H ). It fol-
lows that Pr(H jE1) > Pr(H ) and Pr(H jE2) > Pr(H ). Each piece of evi-
dence individually conﬁrms H. It is also clear from the data that Pr(E1 &
E2jH) < Pr(E1 & E2j∼H), which means Pr(H jE1 & E2) < Pr(H). The
combined evidence is disconﬁrming. This, then, is a case of DE.12 This case
illustrates one possible way in which dyssynergy can arise.12. At l
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 4274.2. Interacting Drugs. The structure of dependencies represented in
ﬁgure 5 is another form of departure from the ideal robustness argument.
The following case illustrates the dependencies represented in ﬁgure 5.
Suppose you are a hospital physician, pondering a hypothesis about a pa-
tient’s survival (let H be “the patient will live”), C1 is “the patient took drug
X,” C2 is “the patient took drug Y,” and you have available two modes of
evidence: the report from a nurse informing you that the patient is receiving
drug X (call this E1) and the report from a life support machine informing
you that the patient is receiving drug Y (call this E2). Both drug X and drug
Yare known to help such patients, and so Pr(H jE1) > Pr(H ) and Pr(H jE2) >
Pr(H). However, as a matter of fact, drug X binds to drug Y, creating a le-
thal toxin that causes severe brain damage. Therefore, although Pr(H jE1) >
Pr(H) and Pr(H jE2) > Pr(H), Pr(H jE1 & E2) < Pr(H). The evidence from
the twomodes is thus dyssynergystic. HypothesesC1 andC2 (and alsoE1 and
E2) are unconditionally independent, but they become dependent when one
conditionalizes on H. Hypothesis H is a collider and thus does not d-separate
E1 and E2.
Onemight respond to this case by noting that, precisely because the drugs
interact in the way that we have described, the twomodes of evidence are not
in fact ontically independent. As we noted in section 1, OI requires modes to
rely on “unrelated chunks of physics,” to use Hacking’s phrase, or different
“theoretical presuppositions,” to use Culp’s phrase. The two modes of evi-
dence in this case are OI, generally. But—goes this objection—the ontic in-
dependence of the two modes breaks down in this case, because of the way
the drugs interact. (If so, then the case is not an example of dyssynergystic
evidence.) This response entails that determining whether or not modes ofFigure 5. H does not d-separate E1 and E2 because, even though it lies on the only
trail between E1 and E2, it is a collider.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All uevidence are OI cannot be assessed in a general manner but must take into
account causal details of particular cases. (One could respond to the La Jolla
murder mystery example in a similar way.) This way of understanding inde-
pendence between modes of evidence departs signiﬁcantly from the usual
ways that OI is articulated, as described in section 1. CPI relativizes indepen-
dence between modes of evidence to the hypothesis under investigation,
whereas OI (as usually described) is not hypothesis relative in that sense.
Perhaps it should be. In any case, such patches to the concept of OI amount
to rendering it more like CPI (see sec. 4.4).
The two cases above are, admittedly, contrived. One might wonder to
what extent such structures can be found in science. Our aim is not to suggest
that such examples are especially prevalent. Rather, we simply wish to illus-
trate various possible ways that OI evidence can be dyssynergystic.
4.3. Hypothesis Competition. The structure of dependencies represented
in ﬁgure 6 is another form of departure from the ideal robustness argument.
Any straightforward case of hypothesis competition or theoretical change
could satisfy the structure of ﬁgure 6.
4.4. Conditional Probabilistic Independence. Just as there is a way to
guarantee the avoidance of pseudorobustness based on failure of OI (sec. 3),
there is a way to guarantee the avoidance of pseudorobustness based on DE.
A condition that rules out DEwill be one that ensures that Pr(H jE1 & E2) >
Pr(H jE1) and, mutatis mutandis, for E2. The graph of the ideal robustness
argument in ﬁgure 2 represents just such a condition. We can formulate this
condition in different terms as follows.Figure 6. H1 does not d-separate E1 and E2 because of the presence of the alternate
hypothesis H2 (and therefore an alternate trail between E1 and E2).This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All Conditional Probabilistic Independence (CPI). Two pieces of evidence,
E1 & E2, are CPI iff these four conditions hold:use s(i) Pr(H jE1) > Pr(H),
(ii) Pr(H jE2) > Pr(H),
(iii) Pr(E1 & E2jH) 5 Pr(E1jH)  Pr(E2jH),
(iv) Pr(E1 & E2j∼H) 5 Pr(E1j∼H)  Pr(E2j∼H).If E1 and E2 are CPI, then their conjunction must be more conﬁrmatory
than each individual conjunct. We provide a general proof of this in the ap-
pendix.
5. Discussion. We have shown that CPI provides a minimal justiﬁcation to
robustness arguments based on the concordance of diverse evidence. CPI
guarantees the avoidance of DE. If evidence is CPI, then the second form
of pseudorobustness discussed above is guaranteed to be avoided. However,
note how modest are the gains of CPI and how demanding are its require-
ments. Although CPI is sufﬁcient to avoid pseudorobustness, it does not
warrant the epistemic prize that many have assumed robustness provides.
Recall that those who rely on robustness arguments suppose that OI evi-
dence that individually conﬁrms a hypothesis gives a special epistemic
oomph to a hypothesis when all of the evidence is considered together. That
is what the no-miracles argument, or argument from coincidence, seems to
suppose (sec. 1). CPI does not justify this special epistemic oomph. The ar-
gument here merely guarantees that CPI evidence provides some more sup-
port to a hypothesis than evidence that is not CPI.
Consider the various cases for realism based on robustness arguments,
noted in section 1, including entity realism, causal realism, theory realism,
and counters to the experimenter’s regress and underdetermination worries.
There is a wide gulf between
(i) Robustness arguments raise the probability of X and
(ii) Robustness arguments warrant realism about X.
One result of section 4 is the demonstration of i when the evidence is CPI.
Another result of section 4 is the demonstration that ii cannot generally be
the case when the evidence is merely OI. But even if the evidence is CPI,
there is a large gulf between i and ii. Proving i lends no warrant to ii.
Thus our argument supports one aspect of a view recently proposed by
Schupbach (2015, forthcoming), who argues that formal explications of ro-
bustness that rely on probabilistic independence are not compelling accounts
ofwhat is typically said to be gained by standard robustness arguments. About
this we agree—satisfying the conditions of CPI does not guarantee that a hy-This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All upothesis gets the special epistemic oomph that is often said to result from ro-
bustness arguments—though we have shown that satisfying the conditions of
CPI guarantees a boost in conﬁrmation to the hypothesis in question.
However, we depart from Schupbach (forthcoming) in the followingway.
Schupbach appeals to a well-known problem that unconditional conﬁrma-
tional independence is not a good representation of robustness arguments,
because multiple lines of evidence (E1 and E2) that conﬁrm H and that
are ontically independent nevertheless are unconditionally conﬁrmationally
dependent: for some measure of incremental conﬁrmation c, c(H , E1jE2) <
c(H , E1). That is, E1 and E2 are unconditionally dependent on each other.
Schupbach goes on to argue that condition iv above is insufﬁcient as an ex-
plication of independence. His argument is compelling: even if H is false,
there are many other possible hypotheses that could explain the converging
evidence, and observing one of those lines of evidence (E1) increases the
probability of observing the other (E2), conditional on some other hypoth-
esis (H 0). Nevertheless, CPI does not hold condition iv as sufﬁcient for an
increase in conﬁrmation based on converging OI evidence, and it is not ren-
dered sufﬁcient by adding conditions i and ii. All of conditions i–iv are in-
dividually necessary subconditions of a sufﬁcient condition, which is CPI.
In short, contrary to Schupbach, we claim that probabilistic accounts of in-
dependent evidence such as CPI are perfectly good explications of one form
of independent evidence, but with Schupbach we agree that this sort of in-
dependent evidence is a long way from accounting for the special epistemic
oomph that many claim arises from robustness arguments.13
Moreover, the requirements of CPI are epistemically strong: in typical
cases it is not clear that CPI is epistemically accessible to experimentalists.
For CPI to be epistemically accessible, one must be able to determine if the
probabilistic equalities and inequalities that constitute CPI are true. That is,
one would have to know that Pr(E1 & E2jH ) 5 Pr(E1jH)  Pr(E2jH) and
that Pr(E1 & E2j∼H ) 5 Pr(E1j∼H)  Pr(E2j∼H), in addition to knowing
that both E1 and E2 conﬁrm H. Another way to put this is that one would
have to know that the empirical scenario for which one has multiple lines
of evidence has a structure of dependency relations that is like that modeled
in ﬁgure 2 and does not have a structure of dependency relations like that of
ﬁgures 3, 4, 5, and 6 (or other possible ways the CPI conditions can fail to
hold). In rich empirical scenarios this is a demanding epistemic requirement.13. Schupbach himself offers an alternative formal account of independent evidence in
robustness arguments by framing robustness arguments as explanatory arguments and
proceeding to offer a logic of such arguments based on recent formal work on explana-
tion. Addressing his positive account would take us astray, but we direct the reader to
Schupbach (forthcoming, sec. 3).
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ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 4316. Conclusion. Two kinds of independence are appealed to in the literature
on robustness: OI and CPI. There are two corresponding ways in which ro-
bustness arguments can fail. The ﬁrst results from a failure of OI. The second
is due to what we call DE. Both forms of pseudorobustness threaten the spe-
cial epistemic oomph often thought to be gained by robustness. For each
form of pseudorobustness, there is a way to avoid it by ensuring that certain
conditions are satisﬁed.
We have shown that OI is insufﬁcient for guaranteeing the special episte-
mic oomph often associated with robustness arguments. That is because of
the possibility of DE.We have also shown that CPI is sufﬁcient to warrant at
least some increase in conﬁrmation when diverse evidence is available. This
increase in conﬁrmation, though, is short of the special epistemic oomph of-
ten presupposed by robustness arguments.
CPI is a hypothesis-relative notion. Its epistemic signiﬁcance comes from
the fact that it rules out DE, which is again a hypothesis-relative notion. The
notions of independence used by many philosophers in robustness-type ar-
guments—versions of OI—are not hypothesis relative. The independence
they rely on is based on a relationship between kinds of evidence, irrespec-
tive of the particular hypothesis being tested. A light microscope and an elec-
tron microscope are ontically independent sources of evidence simpliciter,
not independent relative to some hypothesis.14
There is a tendency to take formal results akin to CPI as an explanation
of the value of ontic independence in robustness arguments. For instance,
Lloyd (2009) appeals to a probabilistic notion of independence similar to
ours as an explanation of why it is valuable to test global climate models us-
ing OI evidence. More broadly, as we saw in section 1, most explications of
robustness arguments are made in terms of OI; but since we have shown that
OI is insufﬁcient to rule out dyssynergystic evidence, it follows that OI is
insufﬁcient as a general basis for warranting claims about the special episte-
mic oomph often said to be gained by robustness arguments. A number of
authors move from the ontic independence of kinds of conﬁrming evidence
in some scientiﬁc episode to a claim that the particular hypothesis under in-
vestigation is therefore more strongly conﬁrmed; the unstated and not gen-14. Howson and Urbach (1989) propose a probabilistic measure for the diversity of a set
of evidence that is not hypothesis relative. The measure tracks the degree to which the
pieces of evidence are unconditionally correlated. This measure is criticized in Wayne
(1995), Myrvold (1996), and Fitelson (2001). If all the evidence is supposed to be ev-
idence for a single hypothesis, then unconditional independence is an inappropriate con-
dition. As Fitelson points out, newspaper reports and radio reports of the same baseball
game are plausibly independent modes of evidence about the game, but they are not un-
conditionally independent. Myrvold patches the correlation view to emphasize indepen-
dence conditional on a hypothesis, but this returns us to a hypothesis-relative conception
of independence and, rightfully, cannot characterize ontic independence.
This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
432 JACOB STEGENGA AND TARUN MENON
All uerally justiﬁed assumption is that conﬁrmatory OI evidence provides the
special epistemic oomph often associated with robustness arguments. OI
does, at least, guarantee that the ﬁrst form of pseudorobustness we discuss
is avoided. But as long as dyssynergystic evidence is possible, the special
epistemic oomph associated with robustness arguments is not warranted
merely by ensuring OI, because of the second form of pseudorobustness.
Some additional condition beyond OI must be appealed to—some condi-
tion that rules out dyssynergy (and, for most applications of robustness ar-
guments, demonstrates that special epistemic oomph). CPI does, in fact,
rule out dyssynergy but does not in addition warrant that special epistemic
oomph. Moreover, CPI is a strong condition, and it is unclear how frequently
experimentalists are in an epistemic position to know that CPI is satisﬁed.Appendix
Proof
Assume that
Pr H jE1ð Þ > Pr Hð Þ, (A1)
Pr H jE2ð Þ > Pr Hð Þ, (A2)
Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ 5 Pr E1jHð Þ  Pr E2jHð Þ, (A3)
and
Pr E1 & E2j∼Hð Þ 5 Pr E1j∼Hð Þ  Pr E2j∼Hð Þ: (A4)
We want to show that Pr(H jE1 & E2) > Pr(H jE1). Assume for reductio
that
Pr H jE1 & E2ð Þ ≤ Pr H jE1ð Þ, (A5)
Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ  Pr Hð Þ= Pr E1 & E2ð Þ ≤ Pr E1jHð Þ  Pr Hð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A6)
from (A5) and Bayes’s theorem (BT);
Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ= Pr E1 & E2ð Þ ≤ Pr E1jHð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A7)
from (A6);
Pr E1 & E2jHð Þ= Pr E1jHð Þ ≤ Pr E1 & E2ð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A8)This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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Pr E2jHð Þ ≤ Pr E1 & E2ð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A9)
from (A3) and (A8);
Pr E2jHð Þ  Pr Hð Þ= Pr E2ð Þ > Pr Hð Þ (A10)
from (A2) and BT;
Pr E2jHð Þ > Pr E2ð Þ (A11)
from (A10);
Pr E1 & E2ð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ > Pr E2ð Þ (A12)
from (A9) and (A11);
1 2 Pr H jE1 & E2ð Þ ≥ 1 2 Pr H jE1ð Þ (A13)
from (A5);
Pr ∼H jE1 & E2ð Þ ≥ Pr ∼H jE1ð Þ (A14)
from (A13);
Pr E1 & E2j∼Hð Þ  Pr ∼Hð Þ= Pr E1 & E2ð Þ
≥ Pr E1j∼Hð Þ  Pr ∼Hð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A15)
from (A14) and BT;
Pr E1 & E2j∼Hð Þ= Pr E1 & E2ð Þ ≥ Pr E1j∼Hð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A16)
from (A15);
Pr E1 & E2j∼Hð Þ= Pr E1j∼Hð Þ ≥ Pr E1 & E2ð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A17)
from (A16);
Pr E2j∼Hð Þ ≥ Pr E1 & E2ð Þ= Pr E1ð Þ (A18)
from (A4) and (A17);
Pr E2j∼Hð Þ > Pr E2ð Þ (A19)
from (A12) and (A18);
Pr ∼H jE2ð Þ  Pr E2ð Þ= Pr ∼Hð Þ > Pr E2ð Þ (A20)
(A15)This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
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All ufrom (A19) and BT;
Pr ∼H jE2ð Þ > Pr ∼Hð Þ (A21)
from (A20);
1 2 Pr H jE2ð Þ > 1 2 Pr Hð Þ (A22)
from (A21); and
Pr H jE2ð Þ < Pr Hð Þ (A23)
from (A22).
There is a contradiction between (A2) and (A23), so we infer the falsity of
(A5). Our four assumptions commit us to the claim that Pr(H jE1 & E2) >
Pr(H jE1). A similar argument could easily be constructed to show that the
assumptions also commit us to the claim that Pr(H jE1 & E2) > Pr(H jE2).REFERENCES
Avery, O. T., C. M. MacLeod, and M. McCarty. 1944. “Studies on the Chemical Nature of the Sub-
stance Inducing Transformation of Pneumococcal Types: Induction of Transformation by a
Desoxyribonucleic Acid Fraction Isolated from Pneumococcus Type III.” Journal of Experi-
mental Medicine 79:137–58.
Bechtel, William. 2002. “Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why
Is It Important?” Philosophy of Science 69 (Proceedings): S48–S58.
Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann. 2004. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon.
———. 1991. “Replicability, Reproducibility, and Robustness: Comments on Collins.” History of
Political Economy 23:143–55.
Claveau, Francois. 2013. “The Independence Condition in the Variety-of-Evidence Thesis.” Philos-
ophy of Science 80:94–118.
Culp, Sylvia. 1995. “Objectivity in Experimental Inquiry: Breaking Data-Technique Circles.” Phi-
losophy of Science 62:438–58.
Fitelson, Branden. 2001. “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications.” Phi-
losophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S123–S140.
Fitz-James, P. 1960. “Participation of the Cytoplasmic Membrane in the Growth and Spore Forma-
tion of Bacilli.” Journal of Biophysical and Biochemical Cytology 8:507–28.
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Howson, Colin, and Peter Urbach. 1989. Scientiﬁc Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. LaSalle,
IL: Open Court.
Hudson, Robert G. 1999. “Mesosomes: A Study in the Nature of Experimental Reasoning.” Phi-
losophy of Science 66:289–309.
———. 2014. Seeing Things. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuorikoski, Jaakko, Aki Lehtinen, and Caterina Marchionni. 2010. “Economic Modeling as Ro-
bustness Analysis.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61:541–67.
Kuorikoski, Jaakko, and Caterina Marchionni. 2016. “Evidential Diversity and the Triangulation
of Phenomena.” Philosophy of Science 83:227–47.
Levins, Richard. 1966. “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology.” American Scien-
tist 54:421–31.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ROBUSTNESS AND INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE 435Lloyd, Elisabeth. 2009. “Varieties of Support and Conﬁrmation of Climate Models.” Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume 83:213–32.
Myrvold, Wayne. 1996. “Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne.” Philos-
ophy of Science 63:661–65.
Odenbough, Jay, and Anna Alexandrova. 2011. “Buyer Beware: Robustness Analyses in Econom-
ics and Biology.” Biology and Philosophy 26:757–71.
Orzack, Steve, and Elliott Sober. 1993. “A Critical Assessment of Levin’s The Strategy of Model
Building in Population Biology (1966).” Quarterly Review of Biology 68:533–46.
Parker, Wendy. 2011. “When Climate Models Agree: The Signiﬁcance of Robust Model Predic-
tions.” Philosophy of Science 78:579–600.
Pearl, Judea. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Rasmussen, Nicolas. 1993. “Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology with the
Electron Microscope.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24:221–65.
Salmon, Wesley. 1984. Scientiﬁc Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
———. 1997. Causality and Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schupbach, Jonah. 2015. “Robustness, Diversity of Evidence, and Probabilistic Independence.” In
Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: ESPA13 Helsinki, ed. Uskali Mäki,
Ioannis Votsis, Stéphanie Ruphy, and Gerhard Schurz, 305–16. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. Forthcoming. “Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science.
Snyder, Laura. 2005. “Consilience, Conﬁrmation, and Realism.” In Scientiﬁc Evidence: Philosoph-
ical Theories and Applications, ed. Peter Achinstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Sober, Elliott. 2008. Evidence and Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stegenga, Jacob. 2011. “The Chemical Characterization of the Gene: Vicissitudes of Evidential As-
sessment.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33:105–27.
Strawson, Peter. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.
Wayne, Andrew. 1995. “Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence.” Philosophy of Science 62:111–21.
Weisberg, Michael. 2006. “Robustness Analysis.” Philosophy of Science 73:730–42.
Whewell, William. 1857. The History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present
Time. New York: Appleton.
Wimsatt, William. 1981. “Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination.” In Scientiﬁc Inquiry
and the Social Sciences, ed. Marilynn B. Brewer and Barry E. Collins. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Woodward, James. 2006. “Some Varieties of Robustness.” Journal of Economic Methodology
13:219–40.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on October 27, 2017 08:41:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
